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NEGLIGENCE-R.Es !PsA LoQuITUR-fuPLICATION To MuLTIPLE DEFEND-

nm ALTERNATIVE-Appellant, a minor, was injured by the explosion
of an "aerial bomb" which he found on a county fair ground. Two of the
defendants admitted having brought aerial bombs to the fair but each entered
evidence which if believed would show that he had not left the article which
injured the appellant. These two defendants were completely independent of
each other and it was admitted that both could not be responsible for the injury
to the child. The lower court instructed the jury that if they could not determine which of the two defendants was actionably negligent, they were compelled
to exonerate both. Held, reversed. An instruction based on res ipsa loquitur
should have been given and if the jury was unable to determine which of two
defendants was guilty of actionable negligence, both should have been held
liable. Litzmann v. Humboldt County, (Cal. App. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 82.
Although the essential elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur have been
modified since their enunciation by Professor Wigmore,1 it is still generally
accepted that some sort of control over the instrumentality causing the injury
must be attributable to the defendant2 Thus the doctrine is not applicable to
two defendants8 unless they can be found to be jointly responsible.4 The
ANTS IN

1 9 WrGMOBB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2509 (1940).
2Exclusive control is necessary. Seeden v. Great Northern R. Co., (Minn. 1954) 65
N.W. (2d) 178. Inference that someone other than the defendant was negligent must be
excluded. Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W. (2d) 806 (1943). The doctrine
is never applicable where the circumstances of the accident do not identify the wrongdoer.
Cruse v. Sabine Transp. Co., (5th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 298. Exclusive control does not
mean sole control, hence landlord and tenant may share control. Marzotto v. Gay Garment
Co., 11 N.J. Super. 368, 78 A. (2d) 394 (1951).
s Estes v. Estes, (Kan. City Ct. of App. 1939) 127 S.W. (2d) 78.
4 52 CoL. L. REv. 537 (1932).
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principal case represents an unprecedented extension of the doctrine to two
completely independent defendants. 5 The court interpreted the earlier California decision in Summers v. Tice6 as authority for the proposition that res ipsa
loquitur can be applied to two defendants in the alternative. The problem in
that case, however, was one of proximate cause; there was no need for the
application of res ipsa loquitur since it was found that both defendants were
actively negligent toward the plaintiff.
Had each of the defendants in the instant case been negligent and left an
aerial bomb on the fair grounds, one of which had injured the plaintiff, and if it
had been impossible to ascertain which bomb had caused the injury, the situation
would have been analogous to that of Summers 11. Tice. Such is not the case.
Here, not only was there a failure to prove negligence on the part of either
defendant, but in addition, since the assumption was that one of the defendants
must be innocent, the burden of proving freedom from negligence was shifted
to an innocent defendant.7 Such a procedural disadvantage could often lead to
liability without fault since an innocent defendant may not always be able to
prove his innocence. If this disadvantage is imposed for policy reasons, the
opinion gives no hint as to what they might be. In another earlier California
decision, Ybarra 11. Spangard,8 an exception was made to the general rule when
multiple defendants were required to meet the inference of negligence placed
upon them by giving an explanation of their conduct. But in that case, emphasis
was placed upon the accessibility of the evidence to the defendants as a reason
for the use of res ipsa loquitur, reference was made to the presumption of negligence used against the common carrier, and stress was laid on the hospitalpatient relationship of the parties. The result has been properly described as
being peculiar to the facts of that case.9 The principal case, if followed, would
extend the reasoning of Ybarra v. Spangard and make it applicable to any case
where there is an injury plus an inference of negligence for which more than
one defendant could be responsible in the alternative. Outside of California
the only cases even remotely analogous have involved vehicle collisions. It has
5 It is recognized generally that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be applied
where several defendants are involved, all of whom could not be negligent, and the inference of negligence against each defendant is of equal weight. Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, (Md. 1954) 106 A. (2d) 98; 65 C.J.S., Negligence §220(8) (1950).
6 33 Cal. (2d) 80, 199 P. (2d) 1 (1948). Plaintiff recovered against two defendants
who fired shotguns in his direction at the same time, though only one caused his injury.
As it was impossible to determine which defendant injured the plaintiff, and since both
were clearly negligent, both were held liable.
7 Res ipsa loquitur is generally considered to be merely the name given to a certain
type of circumstantial evidence. The procedural effect of such evidence may be a mere
inference, a presumption, or may shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Prosser,
"Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,'' 20 l.\fum. L. REv. 241 (1936). Although the
procedural effect of the doctrine in California is not clear [Prosser, "Res lpsa Loquitur in
California,'' 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1949)], a recent case indicates that the burden is
placed upon the defendant to rebut the inference of negligence. See Burr v. SherwinWilliams Co., (Cal. 1954) 268 P. (2d) 1041.
s 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d) 687 (1944); 162 A.L.R. 1258 at 1265 (1946).
9 See 18 So. CAL. L. REv. 310 (1945).
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been held that where two vehicles collide and cause injury to a third person,
res ipsa loquitur may be invoked against both drivers.10 The collision analogy
does not support the result in the principal case, however, since the use of res
ipsa loquitur in these cases is based upon the assumption that both drivers were
negligent or the collision would not have occurred, whereas the court in the
principal case admits that one party defendant must be innocent.11 General
application of this new "California doctrine"-which can hardly be called res
ipsa loquitur as that term has come to be defined-would have an effect that is
immediately apparent. If a person is struck by a Hower-pot which falls from a
multi-storied apartment building, he may recover from all tenants unless the
innocent are able to identify the guilty one.12 It is one thing to allow a jury
to infer that an injury was caused by negligence and that a certain defendant
was probably guilty of this negligence,1 3 but it is quite another to hold several
defendants liable when the most that can be inferred is that one of them might
have been negligent. If the California courts find it desirable to impose a
burden of absolute liability,14 or a presumption of negligence, against those who,
use fireworks or conduct county fairs, they might easily have done so. By twisting the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to fit the facts of the instant case, the court
announced a broader rule than is necessary to achieve the desired result.
Edward H. Hoenicke

10 Pearlman v. W. O. King Lumber Co., 302 lli.
11 This use of res ipsa loquitur in collision cases

App. 190, 23 N.E. (2d) 826 (1939).
is by no means universal. See Yellow
Cab Co. v. Hodgson, 91 Colo. 365, 14 P. (2d) 1081 (1932); 83 A.L.R. II63 (1933);
Termuhlen v. Schaffer, (Ohio 1952) 107 N.E. (2d) 133.
12 See the dissenting opinion of Traynor, J., in Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. (2d) 654,
226 P. (2d) 574 (1951).
·
13 Warner v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 1082, 257 S.W. (2d) 75
(1953).
14 The court specifically rejected absolute liability.

